In the customary VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism truth-telling is a dominant strategy. In this paper we study the sequential VCG mechanism and show that other dominant strategies may then exist. We illustrate how this fact can be used to minimize taxes using examples concerned with Clarke tax and public projects.
Introduction

Motivation
One of the basic assumptions of game theory is that each player is rational, which means that he seeks to maximize his own utility. However, in many circumstances it is also natural to assume that players, when facing a choice, will seek to maximize the utilities of other players, as well.
Such an additional assumption can be used to capture in the game-theoretic framework a 'social attitude' of the players. To quote from Bowles [2004, page 109] (both emphases in the text): "Other-regarding preferences include spite, altruism, and caring about the relationship among the outcomes for oneself and others. [. . . ] The key aspect of other-regarding preferences is that one's evaluation of a state depends on how it is experienced by others." Bowles also provides the following elegant quote from Dalai Lama: "The intelligent way to be selfish is to work for the welfare of others". This additional assumption is also natural in games in which players may or will play repeatedly. Then punishing the other players may have an adverse effect on future rounds in which the punished players may reciprocate. Further, the players who found out that they were punished when another alternative existed may simply refuse to engage in future rounds of the game.
In strategic games the attitude of other players is detected only a posteriori. In contrast, when a game is played sequentially, the attitude of players who already moved is known a priori to players who still need to move. To illustrate these matters on a simple example consider the following strategic game: L C R T 5, 1 0, 0 0, 0 B 0, 0 1, 5 5, 5
Suppose this game is played sequentially under the usual assumption that each player is rational and that this fact is a common knowledge. So second player always chooses a best response and first player knows this.
If player 1 begins, then strategy T guarantees him a payoff of 5, but player 2 will only receive 1. Strategy B also guarantees player 1 a payoff of 5, but only if player 2 is willing to select then strategy R. If player 2 begins, then he will choose either C or R. Both strategies guarantee him a payoff of 5. However, in the first case player 1 will receive only 1, while in the latter case he will receive 5. So irrespectively of the order of the play 'socially responsible' players would select in this game strategies B and R.
Sequential VCG mechanism
In this paper we consider such matters in the context of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, in short VCG mechanism. Its purpose is to induce players to reveal their true types (preferences), usually in various types of auctions or matters concerning public projects. When this is the case, the mechanism is called strategy-proof. The VCG mechanism achieves this by means of transfers. In an important special case of the VCG mechanism, called Clarke mechanism, the transfers become taxes imposed on the players. The underlying game-theoretical framework is that of a revelation-type pre-Bayesian game, see Ashlagi, Monderer and Tennenholtz [2006] .
In the VCG mechanism the players move simultaneously and do not know each other types or utilities (except in degenerated situations), so the above discussion of the attitudes towards the other players does not apply. However, when players move sequentially the situation changes because each player knows the types reported by the previous players. In the resulting set-up the above considerations about attitudes naturally apply. In particular, in the case of sequential Clarke mechanism, the only way player i can increase the payoff of player j is by reducing player's j taxes, which leads us to an analysis when taxes can be minimized.
Sequential VCG mechanism applies to a realistic situation in which there is no central authority that computes and imposes taxes and the order in which the players move depends on Nature.
In this paper we study these matters in a systematic way, by analyzing dominant strategies in the sequential VCG mechanism and by relating them to dominant strategies in sequential pre-Bayesian games. Sequential VCG mechanism is relevant for various types of auctions and for various matters concerned with public projects. The latter area is of natural interest to us, as one is then naturally led to the problem of maximizing social welfare through a minimization of taxes. This explains why our three examples are concerned with Clarke tax and public projects.
Related work
To our knowledge sequential mechanism design was studied only in the context of implementation theory. This theory focusses on a related, but different issue of designing a game whose set of equilibria coincides with the outcomes of a given multi-valued decision function. An early reference on sequential implementation is Moore and Repullo [1988] in which the implementation by means of a subgame perfect equilibrium is studied.
More recently, Parkes and Shneidman [2004] studied a way of realizing the VCG mechanism with the role of the central planner reduced to a minimum. This leads to a distributed implementation of VCG mechanism.
The problem of minimizing taxes was recently addressed in Cavallo [2006] , who studied the issue of redistributing the taxes in the (customary) VCG mechanism, so with truthtelling as the dominant strategy. Instead, in our approach we focus on minimizing taxes by means of dominant strategies that differ from truth-telling.
The consequences of sequentiality have also been studied in voting theory and private contributions to public goods. In particular, Dekel and Piccione [2000] explore the relationship between simultaneous and sequential voting games and Varian [1994] studies the behavior of players depending on which position they have to take a decision.
Plan of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we recall the VCG mechanism and Clarke mechanism by focussing on the decision problems. Next, in Section 3, we clarify why in many natural circumstances truthful reporting in VCG mechanism is indeed necessary. Then, in Section 4, we consider sequential decision problems and in Section 5 we clarify the relation with sequential pre-Bayesian games.
The sequential VCG mechanism is discussed in Section 6. In the last three sections of the paper we consider specific instances concerned with Clarke tax and public projects. In each case we give dominant strategies that minimize players' taxes and are different from truth-telling.
Preliminaries
We recall here briefly the VCG mechanism, see, e.g. Jackson [2003] . Assume a set of decisions D, a set {1, . . ., n} of players, for each player a set of types Θ i and a utility function
A decision rule is a function f : Θ → D, where Θ := Θ 1 × · · · × Θ n . We call the tuple
Given a decision problem one is interested in the following sequence of events:
(i) each player i receives a type θ i , Intuitively, the sum j =i v j (f (θ), θ j ) represents the society benefit from the decision f (θ), with player i excluded.
The VCG mechanism depends on the sequence of functions h 1 , . . ., h n . Occasionally we shall refer to 'each' mechanism to stress that the result does not depend on the choice of these functions. Finally, recall the following crucial result.
VCG Theorem Suppose the decision rule f is efficient. Then in each VCG mechanism the decision rule (f, t) is strategy-proof.
Proof. For all θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ {1, . . ., n} and θ ′ i we have by definition of the VCG mechanism and the fact that f is efficient:
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In each VCG mechanism given the sequence θ of announced types, t(θ) = (t 1 (θ), . . ., t n (θ)) is the sequence of the resulting payments that the players have to make. If t i (θ) ≥ 0, we say that player i receives the payment t i (θ) and otherwise that player i makes the payment |t i (θ)|.
A special case of the VCG mechanism, called Clarke mechanism, is obtained by using
So then
Hence for all θ and i ∈ {1, . . ., n} we have t i (θ) ≤ 0, which means that each player needs to make the payment |t i (θ)| that we call a tax .
Truthful reporting in the VCG mechanism
The following simple observation shows that for each player in each VCG mechanism his payoff remains the same if his submitted type leads to the same decision as his true type.
Proof. By definition of the VCG mechanism we have
This directly implies (i). To prove (ii) note that by efficiency of f and the second assumption of (ii)
This implies (ii). 2
Note that in the proof of (i) efficiency of f is not used and that in (ii) the first assumption is implied by the second.
Observation (i) is of limited use since in the VCG mechanism players submit their types simultaneously and in general player i does not know the other submitted types θ −i . So he has no way of ensuring that equality (1) holds for his submitted type θ ′ i and the other submitted types θ −i .
In contrast, observation (ii) is of use in a number of situations. Namely, if player i knows the underlying decision problem (D, Θ 1 , . . ., Θ n , v 1 , . . ., v n , f ), he can check for his true type θ i and another type θ ′ i whether (2) holds for some θ −i . If it does, he has to submit his true type θ i . Now, in several natural instances of the VCG mechanism for all i and θ i = θ ′ i inequality (2) holds for some θ −i . In these instances players have to submit their true types. Examples include public project examples that we discuss in later sections.
Moreover, even if a player knows the types submitted by the other players he still may be forced to submit his true type when he does not know their utility functions. The following general result clarifies this claim. We assume here that player i knows D, Θ 1 , . . ., Θ n , f , knows that the decision function f is efficient and knows the submitted types θ j for j = i, but does not know v j for j = i.
Then for some utility functions v j , where j = i
• f is efficient,
, and define
and arbitrary e.
Hence we have
First, we show that given these utility functions
where the second equality follows by (5), the inequality is a direct consequence of ǫ > 0, and the third equality follows by (4). Next, we show that f is efficient. Since we only have two type profiles we only have to show
and
To prove (8) note that
where the first equality follows by (4) and the second one by (5). Next, to prove (9) note that
where the first equality follows by (7), the first inequality is a direct consequence of (3), the second equality follows by definition of q, and the last equality is a direct consequence of (6).
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As an aside note that asumption (3) in the above theorem is necessary.
Suppose that in some VCG mechanism for some θ ∈ Θ and θ
Then (3) holds.
By efficiency of f we have
By adding up these inequalities we get
We clarified here why in many natural circumstances truthful reporting in VCG mechanism is necessary. We now show that in sequential VCG mechanism this does not need to be the case.
Sequential decision problems
In the original set up of a decision problem all players announce their types simultaneously. We now consider a modification of this problem in which types are announced sequentially in a random order. For notational simplicity, we consider the order to be 1, . . ., n. To capture this type of situations, given the decision problem (D, Θ 1 , . . ., Θ n , v 1 , . . ., v n , f ) we consider a modified sequence of events in which events (ii) and (iii) of Section 2 are replaced by:
(ii) ′ successively stages 1, . . ., n take place, where in stage i player i announces to the other players a type θ ′ i ; this yields a joint type
We call the resulting situation a sequential decision problem. So in a sequential decision problem no central planner exists and the decisions are taken by the players themselves. Each player i knows the types announced by players 1, . . ., i − 1. He can then use this information to decide which type to announce. To properly describe this situation we need to consider strategies. In this context, a strategy of player i is a function
We then assume that in the considered sequential decision problem each player uses a strategy s i (·) to select the type he will announce. We say then that the strategy s i (·) of player i is dominant if for all θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ {1, . . ., n} and θ
In this context, θ 1 , . . ., θ i−1 are the announced types of players 1, . . ., i − 1, while θ i is the type player i has received.
Consider now the projection function
where π i (θ 1 , . . ., , θ i ) := θ i . Note that π 1 (·) is the identity function. In this context the projection function π i (·) as a strategy for player i corresponds to his truth-telling. We have then the following observation the proof of which is immediate and omitted.
Note 4.1 Given a decision problem (D, Θ 1 , . . ., Θ n , v 1 , . . ., v n , f ) the decision rule f is strategy-proof iff for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n} the projection function π i (·) is a dominant strategy for player i in the corresponding sequential decision problem.
Sequential pre-Bayesian games
Before we consider sequential VCG mechanisms let us clarify the connection between sequential decision problems and strategic games. To this end we consider a modification of pre-Bayesian games (see e.g. Ashlagi, Monderer and Tennenholtz [2006] ). These games are distinguished by the fact that each player has a private type on which he can condition his strategy.
Pre-Bayesian games
Recall first that a pre-Bayesian game for n players consists of
• a set A i of actions,
• a set Θ i of types,
• a payoff function
for each player i. Let Θ := Θ 1 × . . . × Θ n and A := A 1 × . . . × A n . In a pre-Bayesian game Nature moves first and provides each player i with a type θ i ∈ Θ i . Subsequently the players simultaneously select their actions. Each player knows only his type. The payoff function of each player now depends on his type, so after each player selected his action, each player knows his payoff but does not know the payoffs of the other players.
The customary notion of a dominant strategy is naturally adapted as follows. First, a strategy in a pre-Bayesian game is now a function s i : Θ i → A i . Further, a strategy s i (·) of player i in a pre-Bayesian game is called dominant if for all a ∈ A and
Finally, a pre-Bayesian game is of a revelation-type if A i = Θ i for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. We denote then the elements of A i by a i or θ i . So in a revelation-type pre-Bayesian game the strategies of a player are the functions on his set of types.
Sequential pre-Bayesian games
In this modification of pre-Bayesian games Nature moves again first and provides a type θ i ∈ Θ i for each player i and an order, say 1, . . ., n, in which the players sequentially select their actions. We call the resulting game a sequential pre-Bayesian game. In this game a strategy of player i is now a function
Such a strategy
As before a sequential pre-Bayesian game is of a revelation-type if A i = Θ i for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}. With each decision problem (D, Θ 1 , . . ., Θ n , v 1 , . . ., v n , f ) we can associate a revelation-type (sequential or not) pre-Bayesian game by defining each payoff function
The following observation then clarifies the connection between dominant strategies in the sequential decision problems and sequential pre-Bayesian games. The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted.
Note 5.1 A strategy s(·) of player i is dominant in the sequential decision problem
(D, Θ 1 , . . ., Θ n , v 1 , . . ., v n , f ) iff
it is dominant in the corresponding sequential revelationtype pre-Bayesian game.
Consequently, by Note 4.1, the decision rule f is strategy-proof iff for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n} the projection function π i (·) is a dominant strategy for player i in the corresponding sequential revelation-type pre-Bayesian game.
Sequential VCG mechanism
A particular case of sequential decision problems is the sequential VCG mechanism. We now analyze dominant strategies in its context. The crucial difference between the customary set-up and the one now considered is that player i knows the types announced by players 1, . . ., i − 1. He can then exploit this information when choosing the type he is to announce. In the subsequent sections we show that in a number of natural instances of the sequential Clarke mechanism other dominant strategies for players exist than the projection function (that is, truth-telling) and that they can be used to minimize taxes.
The following consequence of Lemma 3.1 provides us with a simple method of determining whether a strategy is dominant in the sequential VCG mechanism.
Lemma 6.1 Let (D, Θ 1 , . . ., Θ n , v 1 , . . ., v n , f ) be a decision problem with efficient f . In each sequential VCG mechanism,
then strategy s i (·) is not dominant for player i.
Proof.
(i) Take an arbitrary θ ∈ Θ and θ ′ i ∈ Θ i . By Lemma 3.1(i)
But by the VCG Theorem the decision rule (f, t) is strategy-proof, so for every θ
which concludes the proof.
(ii) By Lemma 3.1(ii) it follows
which concludes the proof. 2
Intuitively, this lemma states that if the choice of type determined by strategy s i (·) always leads to the same decision as truth-telling, then s i (·) is dominant. Besides, if there is a type profile for which strategy s i (·) leads to a different decision than truth-telling and to which the society is not indifferent, then the strategy is not dominant.
In the remainder of the paper we show that in a number of natural instances of the sequential VCG mechanism natural dominant strategies different than truth-telling exist. All of them deal with Clarke taxes in the context of public projects.
Recall that in Clarke mechanism, if player i submits a type θ ′ i and the other submitted types are θ −i , each player j pays the tax |t j (θ ′ i , θ −i )|, where
In the sequential Clarke mechanism we have t j (θ ′ i , θ −i ) ≤ 0, so player i, when using Lemma 6.1(i) to minimize player's j tax, solves the following maximization problem:
7 Example: public project I
This example corresponds to the decision problem (D, Θ 1 , . . ., Θ n , v 1 , . . ., v n , f ), where
• D = {0, 1} (reflecting whether a project is cancelled or takes place),
• each Θ i is a set of non-negative reals, including 0 and c,
In this setting c is the cost of the project, c n is the cost share of the project for each player, and θ i is the value of the project for player i. Besides, note that the decision rule f is efficient since
We have then the following result.
Theorem 7.1 The following strategy is dominant for player i in the sequential Clarke mechanism for the above decision problem:
Proof. By Lemma 6.1 it suffices to show that f (s i (θ 1 , . . ., θ i ), θ −i ) = f (θ i , θ −i ). For this we consider three cases. 2
We now prove that in the sequential Clarke mechanism considered in Theorem 7.1 the strategy s i (·) of player i simultaneously solves the above maximization problems (10) for j = i, i.e., this strategy of player i minimizes the tax of every other player. More precisely, we establish the following result.
Theorem 7.2 Consider the sequential Clarke mechanism of Theorem 7.1 and the strategy s i (·) of player i introduced there. Suppose that s
In other words, if strategy s i (·) of player i deviates from truth-telling, then player i minimizes taxes of other players under the assumption that he submits a type that will not alter the decision taken in case of truth telling by all players. Proof. Let
We have for all θ ∈ Θ, j = i and θ
By definition of s i (·) we have i = n and
which implies the claimed inequality.
Case 2 s i (θ 1 , . . ., θ i ) = c. Then
Let us illustrate the above two theorems by two examples. Example 7.3 Suppose there are three players, A, B, and C whose types (values) are respectively 60, 70, and 250, each player can submit an arbitrary non-negative value, and the total cost c of the project equals 300. In the customary situation, when the players submit their values simultaneously the project takes place (the efficient decision is 1) and we get the situation summarized in Table 1 , where R + denotes the set of non-negative reals. Consider now the situation in which the players submit their values sequentially and each of them follows strategy s i (·). There are three possible cases. The resulting taxes are summarized in Table 2 .
• Player A is the last player. According to strategy s i (·) players B and C will submit their true values, since for each of them the first alternative in the definition of s i (·) holds. However, player A will submit 300 since for him the third alternative holds. The tax of player B remains 0, but the tax of player C gets modified and, in accordance with the proof of Theorem 7.2 (Case 2 ), becomes 0.
• Player B is the last player.
The situation is analogous to the previous case. Player B will submit 300. As a result all taxes become 0.
• Player C is the last player.
Here players A and B will submit their true values, but player C will submit 300. This does not modify the taxes of players A and B (which remain 0) and player's C tax also remains 70.
Note that in the first two cases, according to strategy s i (·), if player C is second he will submit 300, but this is irrelevant for the analysis. We conclude that if each player follows strategy s i (·), in four out of six orderings all taxes are reduced to 0.
This example also shows that if strategy s i (·) of player i does not deviate from truthtelling, then player i does not need to minimize taxes of other players. Indeed, if player C is the last player, then according to the s i (·) strategy the second player will submit his true value, whereas submitting 300, a value that would not alter the decision taken, would reduce the tax of player C to 0. The problem is of course that the second player does not know which decision will be taken and hence, by Lemma 6.1(i), is bound to submit his true value.
2 In general, if i is the first player for which i j=1 θ j ≥ c, then according to strategy s i (·) he will submit c. This reduces the taxes of all players except him to 0 (Case 2 in the proof of Theorem 7.2). Player's i tax may or may not become 0. If he is not the last player, then all players i + 1, . . ., n following him will also submit c, which will ensure that all taxes including the one of player i will become 0.
If for no i, i j=1 θ j ≥ c, the situation changes, as the following example illustrates.
Example 7.4 We change the setting of the previous example and assume that the values of players A, B, and C are respectively 60, 70, and 150 while the project cost remains 300. Now when they submit their values simultaneously the project does not take place (the efficient decision is 0) and we get the situation summarized in Table 3 . In the sequential case, according to the strategy s i (·), the first two players will submit their true types and the last player will submit 0, since for him the second alternative in the definition of s i (·) holds.
Again we have three cases. The resulting taxes are summarized in Table 4 .
• Player A is the last player.
By submitting 0 player A reduces the tax of player B to 0, the tax of player C remains 0 and the tax of player A remains 20.
By submitting 0 player B reduces the tax of player A to 0, the tax of player C remains 0 and the tax of player B remains 10.
By submitting 0 player C reduces the taxes of players A and B to 0 and his tax remains 0. 
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 7.1, it suffices to show by Lemma 3.1 that f (s i (θ 1 , . . ., θ i ), θ −i ) = f (θ i , θ −i ). For this we consider three cases. 
for all j = i, θ i+1 ∈ Θ i+1 , . . ., θ n ∈ Θ n , and θ
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 7.2. We consider two cases.
The rest of the proof of both cases is the same as in the proof of Theorem 7.2. 2
Let us illustrate now the above two theorems with the following example. However, in the sequential case a new situation arises when player B is the last player. The reason is that now the second player knows that the project will not take place, that is for him the second alternative in the definition of s i (·) holds. So the second player will submit 0. Also player B will submit 0. As a result all taxes will be reduced to 0.
In the other ordering of the players the situation will remain as in Example 7.4. In particular, when player A is the last player his tax will remain 20. The reason is that the second player does not know yet that the project will not take place, that is for him the first alternative in the definition of s i (·) holds. So the second player will submit his true value.
The situation is summarized in Table 6 . So each player i submits a vector of m non-negative reals, reflecting his appreciation for the individual projects. Each real θ ik is player's i appreciation for project k and is taken from the interval [0, r ik ]. When project d is selected and player's i true type is θ i , his utility is θ id . The decision function f selects the project with the largest aggregated appreciation (with ties randomly broken). It is easy to see that f is efficient.
When players submit their types sequentially, player i knows the submitted types θ j for j ∈ {1, . . ., i − 1} and his own type θ i . Then i j=1 θ jl ≤ i j=1 θ jl + n j=i+1 r jl is the maximum possible aggregated appreciation for project l, as perceived by player i. We use it in the following result.
Theorem 9.1 The following strategy is dominant for player i in the sequential Clarke mechanism for the above decision problem: Example 9.3 Suppose that it has to be decided which project out of two is going to be realized. Moreover, the decision is going to take place depending on the valuations of three players, A, B, and C, whose types (values) and type spaces are summarized in Table 7 Consider now the situation in which the players submit their values sequentially and each of them follows strategy s i (·). There are three possible cases.
• Player A is the last player. According to strategy s i (·) players B and C will submit their true values, since it is not known which project will be chosen before A's submission. Therefore in the definition of s i (·) the first alternative holds for each of them. However, player A will submit (0, 10) since he knows that project 2 will take place and therefore for him the second alternative holds. The tax of player A remains 1, that of player B remains 0, but the tax of player C gets modified becoming 1 instead of 8.
In this situation, the second player always knows which project will be chosen. Hence player A will submit (0, 10) when he is second and player C will submit (0, 40) when he is second. As a result, all taxes become 0.
This situation is similar to the first one. Here only player C knows that project 2 will be chosen before his submission and can deviate from truth-telling. According to the s i (·) strategy player C will submit (0, 40) while players A and B will submit their true values. This does not modify the taxes of players B and C (which remain 0 and 8) but player's A tax becomes 0.
The situation is summarized in Table 8 . 
